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Abstract 
 
The imposition of life sentences upon prisoners, and their compatibility with the European 
Convention on Human Rights, is a contentious legal and political issue, especially in the 
United Kingdom. Applications to the Strasbourg Court against the UK have resulted in a 
number of legally significant and sometimes seemingly contradictory outcomes. The Grand 
Chamber’s controversial 2017 Hutchinson judgment seems to come to the opposite 
conclusion to the landmark Vinter judgment four years earlier, which may at first seem to 
demonstrate a watering-down of Convention standards. However, by looking at Hutchinson 
in its wider context, including its interpretation in the subsequent case of Matiošaitis v 
Lithuania, it seems to be the case that, at least in the eyes of the Second Chamber, the 
significance of Hutchinson is largely limited to the factual situation in the United Kingdom, 
and does not seem to signal a wider change of direction for the general Strasbourg 
jurisprudence. 
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Over the last ten years, in what has been described by one judge as a “breathtakingly fast 
process”,1 the European Court of Human Rights has handed down a series of rulings on 
whether so-called ‘life sentences’ – imprisonment for an indefinite term without any formal 
opportunity for parole, release or reduction – are compatible with the European Convention 
on Human Rights (“the Convention”). The relevant right engaged in such cases is Article 3, 
which prohibits the infliction of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment in absolute terms.2 
The Court has suggested that the imposition of a truly irreducible life sentence would 
constitute such treatment because: 
 
“Even those who commit the most abhorrent and egregious acts nevertheless retain 
their essential humanity and carry within themselves the capacity to change… to deny 
them the experience of hope [of release] would be to deny a fundamental aspect of 
their humanity, and to do that would be degrading”3 
 
Until recently, the jurisprudence in this area has been relatively clear, with the Court handing 
down a set of cases which were, albeit sometimes imperfectly, generally consistent with each 
other. Change, if it did come, tended to be incremental, and in one direction: towards greater 
protection for life prisoners, by imposing tighter conditions upon states subjecting prisoners 
to whole-life tariffs.  
 
In January 2017, however, the Grand Chamber handed down its decision in Hutchinson v 
UK,4 holding that the whole-life sentence regime in the United Kingdom was at that point 
Convention compliant, departing from its contrary pronouncement four years earlier.5 The 
decision seems to take a comparatively less stringent position with regards to Article 3 than it 
																																																						
1 Matiošaitis and Others v Lithuania (App Nos.22662/13, 51059/13, 58823/13, 59692/13, 57900/13, 
60115/13, 69425/13 and 72824/13), judgment of 23 May 2017, concurring opinion of Judge Kūris at 
[3]. 
2 Article 3, European Convention of Human Rights. See, for example, Gäfgen v Germany (2011) 52 
E.H.R.R. 1 at [87]. 
3 Matiošaitis (App No.22662/13) at [180]. For further views on the link between life sentences and the 
dehumanisation of the person, see N. Mavronicola, “Inhuman and Degrading Punishment, Dignity, 
and the Limits of Retribution” (2014) 77(2) M.L.R. 292; A. von Hirsch and A. Ashworth, 
Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (Oxford: OUP, 2005), p.86; Wellington v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWHC 1109 (Admin); [2008] 3 All E.R. 248, at 
[39 (vi)] (Laws LJ). 
4 Hutchinson v United Kingdom (App No.57592/08), judgment of 17 January 2017 (Grand Chamber). 
5 Vinter v United Kingdom (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1. The Grand Chamber judgment was handed down on 
9 July 2013. 
did in the preceding case law,6 reducing rather than strengthening prisoner protections, and, 
on its face, advocating a lower-intensity standard of review. This article seeks to go beyond 
this preliminary evaluation by assessing the Hutchinson case in its proper context; looking at 
the preceding case law, the judgment itself, and, crucially, the way in which the case was 
considered in the Court’s more recent judgment of Matiosaitis v Lithuania.7 In doing so, it 
will be questioned whether Hutchinson really does signify a wider change of direction in the 
Court’s jurisprudence, or whether, construed retrospectively, it should be treated as an 
exceptional case if applicable only to its own facts. 
 
 
The emergence of the jurisprudence: The Kafkaris era 
 
In 2008, the Grand Chamber handed down its judgment in Kafkaris v Cyprus,8 finding, for 
the first time, that the imposition of a whole-life sentence could violate Article 3 of the 
Convention. The Court established that where a prisoner was held without “any prospect of 
release”9 whatsoever, this would constitute degrading treatment and fall foul of Article 3. To 
remedy this possibility, the Court held that some “possibility of review”10 allowing for the 
consideration of release must be in place.  
 
Whilst undoubtedly a landmark case, establishing important principles and setting the path 
for further development, Kafkaris and the cases that immediately followed it now seem 
relatively conservative in their scope. For example, in subsequent cases, when invoking 
Kafkaris, the Court tended to synthesise its principles into singular requirement – that the 
sentence is “de facto and de jure reducible.”11 Generally, this did not mandate a particularly 
high level of scrutiny; the Court said that if a prisoner was “not deprived of all hope” of 
release or reduction of their sentence, they could not rely on Article 3.12 Thus prisoners were 
																																																						
6 M. Pettigrew, “A Vinter Retreat in Europe: Returning to the issue of whole-life sentences in 
Strasbourg” (2017) 8(2) New Journal of European Criminal Law 128. 
7	Matiošaitis (App No.22662/13).	
8 Kafkaris v Cyprus (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 35. 
9 Kafkaris (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 35 at [98]. 
10 Kafkaris (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 35 at [98]. 
11 see, for example: Ahmad v United Kingdom (2013) 56 E.H.R.R. 1, at [242]; Törköly v Hungary 
(App No.4413/06), decision of 5 April 2011; Kafkaris (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 35 at [98]. 
12 Streicher v Germany (App No.40384/04), decision of 10 February 2009. See also Iorgov v Bulgaria 
(No. 2) (App No.36295/02), judgment of 2 September 2010, at [52]: a state cannot “deprive the 
applicant of all hope of release or reduction of sentence”.  
held not to be deprived of all such hope where their sentence was subject to a discretionary 
Presidential (or Vice-Presidential) power of clemency,13 nor when the possibility of parole 
fell on a date outside their expected lifespan.14 On one occasion the Court found that the mere 
existence of “mechanisms... available” was enough to satisfy the requirements Article 3, 
without further scrutiny.15 It would seem that the Court was reluctant to find a breach of 
Article 3 so long as it could identify any potential avenue for release, however remote or 
unrealistic. Perhaps because of this, the early case law indicates no real trouble in applying 
Kafkaris; its application in each case was presented as relatively straightforward in practice, 
without the need for any major elaboration.16  
 
 
The advent of Vinter 
 
In 2013, the Grand Chamber handed down its judgment in Vinter and Others v UK.17  It 
became – and probably remains – the leading Strasbourg authority on life sentences; it is 
generally promulgated as the definitive statement of the law in this area (which is sometimes 
now even referred to by shorthand as “Vinter standards”.)18 This is partially because it is a 
more recent Grand Chamber decision, but also because, vitally, it is taken to have expanded 
and elaborated on the requirements of Article 3 beyond the embryonic statements in Kafkaris. 
Indeed, commentators have drawn a distinction between the early case law on the one hand 
and the “post-Vinter case law”19 on the other.  
 
Vinter upheld much of the essence of the previous law; the Court repeated that in order to 
comply with Article 3, any sentence must be “de facto and de jure reducible”,20 requiring a 
																																																						
13 Kafkaris (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 35; Iorgov (No. 2) (App No.36295/02). 
14 Törköly (App No.4413/06). 
15 Ahmad (2013) 56 E.H.R.R. 1 at [244]. 
16 Garagin v Italy (App No.33290/07), decision of 29 April 2008; Streicher (App No.40384/04); 
Iorgov (No 2) (App no.36295/02); Lynch and Whelan v Ireland (App Nos.70495/10 and 74565/10), 
decision of 18 June 2013. A possible exception might be the partly dissenting opinions in Kafkaris 
(2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 35 itself.  
17	Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1.	
18 see e.g. Matiošaitis (App No.22662/13), concurring opinion of Judges Lemmens and Spano. 
19 TP and AT v Hungary (App Nos. 37871/14 and 73986/14), judgment of 4 October 2016, dissenting 
opinion of Judge Kūris, at [16]; Matiošaitis (App No.22662/13), concurring opinion of Judge Kūris, at 
[2], [3], [19]. 
20 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 at [107] 
“possibility of review” (executive or judicial)21 regarding a “prospect of release”.22 Article 3, 
therefore, was read as “requiring the reducibility of the sentence”23 and later cases explicitly 
confirmed that the absence of any review mechanism would, therefore breach Article 3.24 All 
of this sits easily with Kafkaris. 
 
However, the Court went further. In the case itself, and through its progeny,25 it established 
that in order for a sentence to be reducible in practice, in addition to the mere existence of a 
review mechanism, four additional criteria must be met: firstly, the review must meet a 
certain standard; secondly, the conditions of that review must be clear and knowable to the 
prisoner; thirdly, the review mechanism must be in place from the imposition of the sentence; 
fourthly, the conditions must be clear and knowable from the imposition of the sentence.  
 
In elucidating the first requirement, a sufficient standard of review, the Court set out what a 
review mechanism must do to ensure a sentence is really ‘de facto and de jure reducible’. 
Thus, the conditions of review must relate to the appropriateness of the sentence under 
relevant penological grounds.26 As the Court put it in Öcalan (No 2), any review must assess: 
 
“whether the applicant’s continued incarceration is still justified… either because the 
requirements of punishment and deterrence have not yet been entirely fulfilled or 
because the applicant’s continued detention is justified by reason of his 
dangerousness”27  
 
																																																						
21 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 at [119]-[121]. 
22 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 at [108]. 
23 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 at [119]. 
24 Öcalan v Turkey (No 2) (App Nos. 24069/03, 197/04, 6201/06 and 10464/07), judgment of 19 
March 2014, at [204]; László Magyar v Hungary (App No.73593/10), judgment of 20 May 2014, at 
[52]. 
25 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 and the subsequent case law will be referenced interchangeably; whilst 
some later cases have been viewed as developing the law beyond Vinter (e.g. the Court in TP and AT 
(App Nos. 37871/14 and 73986/14) suggested one later case “further developed” the law, at [38]), the 
subsequent case law tends to treat this group of cases synonymously – see Hutchinson (App 
No.57592/08) at [42]. 
26 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 at [119]; László Magyar (App No.73593/10) at [50]; Čačko v Slovakia 
(App No.49905/08), judgment of 22 July 2014, at [73]. 
27 Öcalan (App Nos. 24069/03, 197/04, 6201/06 and 10464/07), at [207]. 
As such, post-Vinter, a review based on unrelated considerations such as ill-health or the 
whim of a president will not meet such criteria.28 In addition, these conditions have to be 
possible to attain; prisoners must be given “a chance, however remote, to someday regain 
their freedom”29 and impossible conditions or insurmountable barriers, such as the inclusion 
of psychiatric requirements in a facility without relevant facilities to identify these30 will not 
grant the prisoner the necessary hope of release. In relation to this, the Court has set out a 
broad timeframe in which the review must take place; it has established a 25-year 
consensus,31 with 30 potentially permitted,32 but not 40.33 A disproportionately long waiting 
time before review becomes available to a prisoner risks creating a situation where a prisoner 
is unable to challenge the legitimacy of their continued incarceration at a time when 
penological justifications may have legitimately altered.34 Article 3, therefore, requires a 
proper review , whether executive or judicial in nature,35 of the necessity of continued 
incarceration within a reasonable time as to ensure the utility of such a review. 
 
The second requirement relates to the clarity of the requirements of release. The conditions 
themselves must be sufficiently clear and understandable. It must be clear “what [a prisoner] 
must do to be considered for release and under what conditions”36 and these conditions must 
be made known to the prisoner, to the extent that they can gain a “precise cognisance” of 
such requirements.37  
 
																																																						
28 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 at [127]; [129]; Öcalan (App Nos. 24069/03, 197/04, 6201/06 and 
10464/07), at [203]; Bodein v France (App No.40014/10), judgment of 13 November 2014, at [56]; 
Kaytan v Turkey (App No.27422/05), judgment of 15 September 2015, at [65]; Murray v Netherlands 
(2017) 64 E.H.R.R. 3, at [100]. 
29 Harakchiev and Tolumov v Bulgaria (App Nos.15018/11 and 61199/12), judgment of 8 July 2014, 
at [264]. 
30 Murray (2017) 64 E.H.R.R. 3 at [125]. 
31 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 at [120]. 
32 Bodein (App No.40014/10) at [61]-[62]. 
33 TP and AT (App Nos. 37871/14 and 73986/14) at [45]. 
34 TP and AT (App Nos. 37871/14 and 73986/14) at [48]. 
35 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 at [119]-[121]. Some judges have questioned whether the later case 
law mandates a judicial, rather than executive review – see Matiošaitis (App No.22662/13), 
concurrence of Judge Kūris; Murray (2017) 64 E.H.R.R. 3, partly concurring opinion of Judge Pinto 
de Albuquerque, at [13] cf. Hutchinson (App No.57592/08) at [47]-[50] and Lendore v Attorney 
General of Trinidad and Tobago [2017] 1 W.L.R. 3369, at [67]: Art 3 does not “mandate any 
particular form of review.” 
36 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 at [122]. 
37 Trabelsi v Belgium (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 21 at [137]. 
The third requirement is that the review mechanism must be in place from the imposition of 
the sentence. In other words, if no review mechanism is in place, the breach of Article 3 will 
be found from the very imposition of the sentence.38 The corollary of this position is that the 
review mechanism must exist through all stages of the incarceration. If at any point the 
prisoner does not have at their disposal a possibility of review, Article 3, it would seem, will 
be breached for the duration of that period, even if remedied at a later stage.39 
 
The fourth requirement is that like the existence and effectiveness of a review mechanism, 
the necessary clarity of the conditions of that mechanism must also be in place from the start 
of the sentence.40 In Trabelsi, the Court used the language of “objective, pre-established 
criteria” allowing the prisoner to know the conditions of release “at the time of imposition of 
the sentence”.41 Like with the third requirement, a level of clarity is continuously required. If 
conditions are not sufficiently clear and cognisable, Article 3 will be breached for the 
duration of their absence, even if clear rules are introduced later.42  
 
The Court applied these requirements stringently to the cases which came before it, including 
in Vinter itself. The case concerned the UK’s life sentencing practice, in which a life 
sentence, once imposed, was only able to be mitigated through the statutory power of 
compassionate release, exercised by the Home Secretary.43 Such a release required, as a 
prerequisite, something akin to terminal illness or serious incapacitation.44 To bolster their 
argument, the UK government suggested that since the Home Secretary had a duty to act 
compatibly with Article 3, she would not (and legally could not) interpret the compassionate 
release guidelines restrictively, and would instead adopt a broad position with regards to its 
use, compatible with the Court’s case law.45 
 
																																																						
38 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 at [122]; Kaytan v Turkey (App No.27422/05) at [66]; Matiošaitis 
(App No.22662/13), concurring opinion of Judge Kūris, at [6]. 
39 Hutchinson (App No.57592/08), dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque.  
40 A. Ashworth, “R. v Newell (Lee William): sentencing – life imprisonment – whole life orders” 
(2014) 6 Crim. L.R. 471, 472. 
41 Trabelsi (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 21 at [137]. 
42 László Magyar (App No.73593/10) at [153]; Čačko (App No.49905/08) at [75]. 
43 Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, s.30. 
44 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 at [12], [43]. 
45 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 at [94]; See R. v Bieber [2009] 1 W.L.R. 223; R. v Oakes and 
Others [2012] EWCA Crim 2435. 
Ultimately, the Court found against the government. It stated that the strict compassionate 
release grounds, taken literally, did not meet the substantive criteria required by Article 346 
and the Court was unconvinced with the government’s claim that the power operated more 
widely in practice.47 Moreover, it found that the guidelines for the power were deemed too 
unclear48 and were not in any case made known to prisoners.49 A violation of Article 3 
resulted.50  
 
It is clear, then, that although both Grand Chamber judgments are often cited together as 
authoritative propositions of law51 that Vinter extended the ‘de facto and de jure reducible’ 
requirement far beyond the initial framework introduced in Kafkaris. The requirements for 
satisfying Article 3 as laid down in Vinter are different – or at least more developed - than 
those in Kafkaris; Judge Kūris goes so far as to suggest Vinter effectively over-rules the 
previous case law.52 In addition, it is doubtful that certain early cases which passed the 
Kafkaris threshold would survive post-Vinter. In Harakchiev, for example, the Court, in 
finding a violation of Article 3, compared its conclusion with its previous finding to the 
contrary some years earlier in an almost identical factual situation. In justifying the 
difference, the Court pointed out that it was “decided after Kafkaris… but before Vinter and 
Others” and that it “cannot adopt the same approach… in light of the Grand Chamber’s later 
ruling, in… Vinter”.53 
 
																																																						
46 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 at [127]. 
47 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 at [126]. 
48 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 at [125], [129]. 
49 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 at [128]. 
50 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 at [130]. 
51 TP and AT (App Nos. 37871/14 and 73986/14), dissenting judgment of Judge Kūris, at [27]. 
52 Matiošaitis (App No.22662/13), concurring opinion of Judge Kūris, at [2], [5]. 
53 Harakchiev and Tolumov (App Nos.15018/11 and 61199/12) at [252]-[253]; compare Iorgov (No 2) 
(App No.36295/02). See also similar assessment of Judge Kūris in TP and AT (App Nos. 37871/14 
and 73986/14), (dissenting opinion of Judge Kūris, at [6]-[8]) regarding that case and Törköly (App 
No.4413/06). 
In sum, through Vinter, the Court ushered in a new understanding of what the Convention 
required in terms of life sentences. The case was followed faithfully in a number of 
decisions,54 resulting in relatively consistent and authoritative line of case law.55  
 
 
A change in approach? Hutchinson v UK 
 
After the Grand Chamber’s ruling in Vinter, the English Court of Appeal handed down its 
ruling in McLoughlin.56 It ‘clarified’ the operation of the Home Secretary’s statutory power 
of compassionate release, describing it as having a “wide meaning”57 beyond its literal (and 
non-binding) wording, allowing (and requiring) the evaluation of penological grounds for 
incarceration. As a result, and disagreeing with the European Court’s conclusion in Vinter, 
the Court of Appeal concluded that the UK system met the Article 3 criteria.58 
 
Following this, in January 2017, the Grand Chamber availed itself of a new opportunity to 
examine the situation in the UK. In that case, Hutchinson v UK,59 the Court essentially 
accepted the Court of Appeal’s argument, and found that the UK’s life sentences framework 
did not breach Article 3. This, of course, is the opposite conclusion to the one it reached in 
Vinter. But in Hutchinson, the Grand Chamber cited both Vinter and Murray in its 
judgment60; nowhere in the judgment does it over-rule or overtly disregard any previous 
authority. In setting out the relevant law, the Court reiterated the post-Vinter principles: there 
must be review on legitimate penological grounds,61 these grounds of review must be clear, 
and crucially,  must be in force and knowable “from the outset”.62 This clearly matches up 
																																																						
54 However, there have been some accusations that later case law subsequently developed the 
jurisprudence beyond that which was set out in Vinter, notably, from the Privy Council in Lendore, 
who regarded the subsequent expansion of the law as a “misunderstanding” of Vinter – see Lendore 
[2017] 1 W.L.R. 3369 at [29]. 
55 ‘Relatively’ perhaps rather than absolutely, as the requirement of imposition from the start of the 
sentence had been applied somewhat flexibly in some of the cases – see, e.g. Čačko (App 
No.49905/08) at [79]-[81]; Koky and Others v Slovakia (App No.13624/03), judgment of 12 June 
2012, at [31]-[33]. 
56 R. v McLoughlin [2014] EWCA Crim 118; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 3964. 
57 McLoughlin [2014] EWCA Crim 118; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 3964 at [33] 
58 McLoughlin [2014] EWCA Crim 118; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 3964 at [35], [37].  
59	Hutchinson v United Kingdom (App No.57592/08).	
60 Hutchinson (App No.57592/08) at [42]. 
61 Hutchinson (App No.57592/08) at [43] 
62 Hutchinson (App No.57592/08) at [44]. 
with the requirements of Vinter as outlined above. Why, then, did the majority of judges in 
the Grand Chamber come to the opposite conclusion to those in Vinter when the principles it 
espoused were identical?  
 
The answer falls to the very dubious application of the law to the facts. As regards the first 
criterion, the standard of review, the Court accepted and upheld the Court of Appeal’s 
statement of the law, accepting that it had “clarified” 63 the UK position and, by implication, 
admitted it had previously misunderstood it in Vinter. Thus, the Court agreed that the Home 
Secretary’s power of compassionate release, properly understood, actually required her to 
review the penological justifications of an individual sentence. This is, of course, a 
contestable claim,64 especially as the same argument was emphatically rejected in Vinter.65 
Nothing had changed in practice between Vinter and Hutchinson, after all.  
 
Even more troublesome is the application of the ‘clarity’ criterion. Thus, even if the Home 
Secretary’s power is construed widely enough to include a proper review of the sentence, this 
does not in itself satisfy Article 3 unless the conditions in which this will take place are clear 
and knowable to the prisoner(s) serving a life sentence. The Home Secretary’s powers stem 
not from a clear code or legislation, but the abstract legal requirement to act in a way that is 
compliant with Article 3. It is not obvious how this can be sufficiently clear and knowable to 
prisoners, especially given that this had been unclear to the Grand Chamber four years 
prior.66 Indeed, the only document prisoners had at their disposal indicating the possible 
conditions of release – the ‘Lifer Manual’ detailing the operation of the ‘compassionate 
grounds’ for release – was problematic for two reasons: it was both non-binding in nature and 
																																																						
63 Hutchinson (App No.57592/08) at [38]-[41]. 
64 See e.g. M. Pettigrew, “A Vinter Retreat in Europe: Returning to the issue of whole-life sentences 
in Strasbourg” (2017) 8(2) New Journal of European Criminal Law 128, 136-137. Alternatively, it 
might be said that the Court of Appeal’s so-called ‘clarification’ itself had the effect of widening the 
UK position so that it is (from that point) compliant with Strasbourg standards. But this does not solve 
other related problems, such as the fact that this policy was not in force from the beginning of the 
sentence, violating Vinter’s third and fourth requirements – see below. 
65 Vinter (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 1 at [126]. 
66 This point has been made forcefully number of commentators in the area: A. Beetham, “Whole life 
orders and article 3” (2017) 81(3) Journal of Criminal Law 236, 237-238; J. Bild, “The whole life 
sentence in England and Wales” (2015) 74(1) C.L.J. 1, 2-3; N. Hart, “Whole Life Sentences in the 
UK: Voite-Face at the European Court of Human Rights?” (2015) 74(2) C.L.J. 205, 207-208. A. 
Ashworth, “R. v Newell (Lee William): sentencing – life imprisonment – whole life orders” (2014) 6 
Crim. L.R. 471, 473. See also Hutchinson (App No.57592/08), dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque, at [31]-[34]. 
actually set out incorrect information,67 pointing exclusively to ill-health or similar 
circumstances as conditions of release and not anything like the post-Vinter penological 
grounds, which the Court accepted were nonetheless operational and crucial to satisfy Article 
3. This clearly seems to be out of step with the previous post-Vinter application of the 
principle. 
 
If the first and second Vinter requirements, that the conditions of release meet a certain 
substance and clarity, were dealt with poorly in Hutchinson, more worrisome still is that the 
third and fourth requirements – that conditions for release should be in force and knowable 
from the imposition of the sentence – were barely acknowledged at all. It is unclear whether 
the Court deemed the ‘clarification’ of the law to apply from the point of its enunciation 
(either when given by the Court of Appeal in 2014 or accepted by the Grand Chamber in 
2017) or whether it applied ex tunc.68 Naomi Hart notes that the prisoner in question in 
Hutchinson was sentenced prior to the the Human Rights Act 1998 becoming coming into 
force in the UK, and thus the Home Secretary would have been under no direct Article 3 
obligations from that source at the time of the imposition of the prison sentence.69 Thus even 
if accepted that the Home Secretary had a sufficiently substantive power to review sentences 
at the time of the prisoner’s imposition, it seems impossible to suggest that this was 
sufficiently clear and knowable to the prisoner from the start of their sentence. Frustratingly, 
the Court glossed over this aspect of the case law altogether. The Court explicitly stated that 
it would evaluate only on the position of the law as in force at the time,70 specifically going 
against both the earlier case law and the Court’s own statement of the law earlier in the 
case.71 Dissenting Judge Lopez Guerra suggested, not without merit, that this could have 
been fatal to the government’s case.72 
 
 
																																																						
67 Hutchinson (App No.57592/08) at [65]: The Grand Chamber recommended revising the Manual 
because it did not reflect the law at the time.  
68 A point that was previously made by Judge Kalaydjeva: see Hutchinson v United Kingdom (2015) 
61 E.H.R.R. 13, dissenting opinion of Judge Kalaydjeva.  
69	N. Hart, “Whole Life Sentences in the UK: Voite-Face at the European Court of Human Rights?” 
(2015) 74(2) C.L.J. 205, 207.	
70 Hutchinson (App No.57592/08) at [73]. 
71 Hutchinson (App No.57592/08) at [44]. 
72 Hutchinson (App No.57592/08), dissenting opinion of Judge Lopez Guerra. 
What is to be made of Hutchinson? On its face, the case seems to show a “backtracking”73 or 
“retreat”74 from Vinter, either by applying an unusually lenient standard of assessment or 
declining to assess some parts of the post-Vinter framework altogether. But the wider 
significance of this is obfuscated by the fact that the Court places this new approach 
alongside a promulgation of the otherwise orthodox principles of the case law. This 
disingenuous tactic – saying one thing and doing another – leaves the law in a state of 
confusion.75 It is unclear from the judgment alone whether Hutchinson should be seen as the 
Court pulling back from Vinter and adopting a new, weaker standard of review,76 or whether 
the Court is continuing to adhere to the Vinter standard, but just applying it sloppily to the 
facts of this case, perhaps mindful of the particular political implications behind its 
judgment.77 Given that “the Convention is what the Strasbourg Court says it is”,78 the Court 
in Hutchinson – the Grand Chamber, no less – succeeded only in making the Convention 
requirements inherently more uncertain.  
 
 
Testing the waters: Matiošaitis 
 
So what is the status of the Vinter case-law post-Hutchinson? A first indication was given by 
the UK Privy Council in July 2017. In Lendore,79 perhaps unsurprisingly, that court treated 
Hutchinson as confirming a narrower Article 3 standard and bolstering the UK’s own 
preferred position,80 consistently with McLoughlin. In fact, it deemed cases like Trabelsi – 
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with its emphasis on “objective, pre-established criteria” as representative of an overzealous 
misapplication of the Article 3 requirement, later corrected by Hutchinson.81  
 
However, more illustrative is the May 2017 Second Chamber judgment of Matiošaitis v 
Lithuania.82 In that case, life prisoners complained that their sentences, indefinite but for the 
possibility of presidential pardon, breached Article 3. The Court took its usual route of setting 
out the case law before applying it to the facts. In doing so, it re-emphasised that there must 
exist a review mechanism allowing for the prospect of release, that review being on proper 
grounds; an “actual assessment of the relevant information [of] whether his or her continued 
imprisonment is justified on legitimate penological grounds”83 rather than of capricious 
things like age and illness.84 It also emphasised that the conditions must be attainable in 
practice85 and reiterated the principle that any grounds for review need to be sufficiently clear 
and knowable.86 Murray87 was cited and paraphrased as authority for this, part of the case law 
canon seemingly discarded in the earlier Privy Council judgment.88  
 
Crucially, when applying these principles to the facts, unlike in Hutchinson, the Court in 
Matiošaitis applied a fairly rigorous test to Lithuania’s prison regime. Whilst in the 
applicants’ cases, their possibility of release came in the form of a presidential pardon, the 
Lithuanian review system was much more formalised than the one in, say, Kafkaris. Unlike 
in Hutchinson, there existed a published list of qualifying considerations, all of which related 
to the ongoing justification of the sentence, which the authorities would take into account 
when reviewing the sentence. Whilst this list was non-exhaustive, this was not in itself fatal.89 
The Court accepted that the review criteria went unchanged during the tenure of the 
applicants’ incarceration,90 that it was available to them and any other prisoner at any point91 
and that that the prison authorities had also put in place certain programs aimed at social 
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rehabilitation of prisoners, thus enabling them to take steps towards attaining the conditions 
required for their release.92 
 
Despite this, the Court found that the system did not meet Convention standards. The review 
mechanism, despite the merit of the pre-established criteria, was nonetheless found to be 
insufficient for prisoners “to know what [they] must do to be considered for release and under 
what conditions”93 especially due to the lack of specific reasons given alongside rejections of 
review applications.94 The absence of such specific reasons meant that prisoners, according to 
the Court, would be left in “a conundrum as to what he or she must do” to gain a pardon.95 
This, coupled with the fact that applications for release were very rarely successful in 
practice,96 caused the Court to deign the pardon system a royal prerogative of mercy rather 
than the type of sophisticated review mechanism necessary for Article 3.97 
 
In addition, whilst accepting that a social rehabilitation program was a positive initiative, the 
Court still found that the poor living conditions within the prison, particularly the number of 
hours life prisoners spend in total isolation, mitigated the effectiveness of any reform 
program: the “deleterious effects of such life prisoners’ regime must have seriously 
weakened the possibility of the applicants reforming”98 and therefore the ability to meet the 
conditions for release. Taking these issues together, the Court ultimately found that the 
Lithuanian system ultimately fell beneath the high standard required to satisfy the 
requirements of Article 3.99  
 
The decision is striking when compared directly to Hutchinson for several reasons. Firstly, in 
Hutchinson, the Court easily accepted the claim that the Home Secretary’s discretion would 
be carried out in a way which allowed the assessment of penological grounds without any 
real evidence to support this; in Matiošaitis, on the other hand, the Court very carefully 
considered whether the required assessment of the required penological grounds would be 
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carried out de facto. To this effect the frequency and operation of the pardoning mechanism 
in practice was not an issue in Hutchinson100 but was deemed very important in Matiošaitis.   
 
Secondly, the mere existence of an abstract legal obligation stemming from the operation of 
Article 3 (clarified only through case law, no less) upon the Home Secretary was enough to 
satisfy Article 3’s clarity requirements in Hutchinson; from this, prisoners were apparently 
able to know what they must do to be eligible for release.101 On the other hand, the detailed 
published list of considerations available to prisoners was not enough in Matiošaitis, partially 
because of a lack of reasons given by the president in practice. On this point, Hutchinson 
simply said that to act compatibly with Article 3 and the Human Rights Act, the Home 
Secretary would be required to “give reasons” - without analysing whether this had ever 
occurred.102  
 
Thirdly, the adequacy of reform programs or the de facto possibility of achieving the 
conditions for release, so fatal a problem in the Matiošaitis judgment, were not even 
mentioned in Hutchinson. 
 
Fourthly, as regards to Hutchinson’s most glaring omission, namely the lack of examination 
into whether the incarceration breached Article 3 from the start of the sentence, Matiošaitis is 
less directly helpful. The particular case facts established that the review mechanism here had 
been in force, relatively unchanged, since the imposition of the sentence.103 Matiošaitis does 
reiterate that an absence of review mechanisms from the beginning of a sentence would mean 
that a breach of Article 3 “arises at the moment of the imposition of the life sentence”,104 
although Hutchinson also relied on authority suggesting the same.105 Nonetheless, the more 
oblique nature of that statement, alongside an emphasis on the fact that Article 3 was 
breached in one applicant’s case despite the fact that he had not yet reached the time period to 
make him eligible for review,106 as well as the apparent examination of how long the review 
mechanism has been in force,107 emphasised the temporal aspect of Article 3 and strongly 
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suggests that the requirement of a framework from the imposition of the sentence has not 
been jettisoned from the jurisprudence.   
 
 
To summarise, it is clear that the Court in Matiošaitis employed a more penetrating 
assessment of Lithuania’s prison system than the Hutchinson Court did with regards to the 
UK. It emphasised to a much greater extent the reducibility of the sentence de facto and the 
clarity of associated criteria for this; asserted a higher standard of proof; applied greater 
scrutiny to the State’s claims, and, crucially, seemed to reassert the strand of jurisprudence 
that Article 3 requirements must be present from the start of the sentence, a facet so gravely 
overlooked in Hutchinson.   
 
 
Conclusions: the current law and the status of Vinter in a post-Hutchinson landscape 
 
Matiošaitis, then, helps shed light on how best to construe Hutchinson, at least according to 
the European judges. It seems like the Court takes an approach that is more consistent with 
the rest of the post-Vinter case law than the Court in Hutchinson did. How is that possible, 
given Hutchinson was decided by the Grand Chamber just six months prior? 
 
One possible explanation is that the Court in Matiošaitis cleverly engineered its way around 
the Hutchinson precedent. Elements of this could be gleamed from the language of the 
Matiošaitis judgment; in the sections dealing with the Court’s findings, Hutchinson is 
mentioned just six times, compared to nine times for Vinter and fourteen times for Murray. 
Where Hutchinson is cited, it is used as authority for setting out a useful overview of the case 
law108 or as a citation for the use of the margin of appreciation.109 It could be, then, that the 
Court in Matiošaitis was doing exactly what the Court in Hutchinson did – saying one thing 
and doing another - by saying a case (here, Hutchinson) applies without actually applying it 
in practice.  
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But the Court need not be framed such a duplicitous way. Rather than viewing Hutchinson as 
establishing a new approach which must be artificially worked around, we can - as it seems 
the Court in Matiošaitis did - instead take Hutchinson as authority only as regards to its own 
factual situation, rather than for a general change in the case law. Hutchinson can be 
retrospectively classified as a case of bad application of the existing law, rather than the good 
application of some modification of it.  
 
This sits more easily with the Court’s approval of Hutchinson in Matiošaitis; it is cited 
alongside authorities like Vinter and Harakchiev without distinction,110 and nowhere in the 
judgment does the Court suggest that Hutchinson represents any sort of departure from the 
previous case law; on the contrary, from the outset, it is presented as an equally authoritative 
statement of the law, standing for exactly the same principles, as the post-Vinter case of 
Murray.111 In confirming Hutchinson in this way, the Court, seemingly paradoxically, also 
confirms Vinter. 
 
In conclusion, the Court in Matiošaitis has shown that Hutchinson need not necessitate the 
discarding of the stringent post-Vinter requirements. On the contrary, Hutchinson can be 
treated as an orthodox statement of law, with the specific application of its facts an isolated 
example, rather than indicating a general trend in the case law. However seemingly fictitious 
this may seem, this seems to be the way the Court is squaring that circle. With at least two 
forthcoming cases in the near future,112 time will tell whether this narrative will prevail in the 
long-term.  
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